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• Rapid progress in basic molecular biology is apparently 
enabling extraordinarily consequential applications, 
including in principle deliberate intervention in the 
process of evolution.
• The same basic science simultaneously identifies both 
therapeutic and destructive possibilities.
• The extended consequences of this situation cannot be 
determined with confidence. 
• Those consequences will assuredly involve social 
dynamics as well as basic science.
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• Recent reconstruction of the 1918 influenza virus is 
currently the leading instance of the more general 
problem.
– Work actually motivated by “historical curiosity” but does have 
potentially important therapeutic implications.
– Degree of oversight and containment applied does not appear 
commensurate with the magnitude of risk entailed.
• Reconstructed strain is substantially more virulent than standard 
reference strains. 
• SARS has escaped BSL 3 containment at least 3 times. 




• The scale and character of potential consequences  
mandate more advanced protective procedures than 
have yet been devised.
• In principle appropriate procedures should: 
– Prevent the deliberate or inadvertent creation of pathogens more
destructive than those that have naturally evolved.
– Assure prudent exploration of protective and therapeutic 
applications.
– Assure equitable access to all constructive applications.
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The Basic Principle of Protection
• Since the potential for constructive and destructive 
application of biotechnology cannot be categorically 
disentangled, effective protection depends on reinforcing 
and existing behavioral rule:
Biotechnology must not be used to do deliberate 
harm under any circumstance for any reason
• Categorical rule must be adapted to specific context to 
be meaningfully applied.
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• That basic principle is reasonably well established as a 
universal norm.
• Has been authoritatively articulated:
– The Hippocratic Oath.
– The 1925 Geneva Protocol. 
– The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
• Is broadly upheld and not expressly rejected.
• Nonetheless it must be substantially strengthened if it is 
to be the practical foundation for protection.
7
The Basic Method of Protection
• In most other areas of high potential consequence 
independent oversight is used as the fundamental 
method of protection.
– Auditing of financial transactions.
– Multiple person access rules for handling nuclear weapons and 
related explosive materials.
– Peer review for publication of scientific results. 
• It is prudent to assume that the principle of independent 
oversight will have to be applied to inherently dangerous 
areas of biological research. 
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Essential Features of Protective Oversight 
• Adequately effective oversight of fundamental 
research would have to be:
– Global in scope of application – all parts of the world.









• An oversight process meeting those criteria might 
operate in three tiers:
– International jurisdiction over research activities of extreme 
concern that might generate pathogens more lethal or otherwise 
more consequential than those currently extant in nature.
– National jurisdiction over research activities of moderate 
concern – the more lethal of currently regulated agents. 
– Local jurisdiction over activities of potential concern involving 
agents that might be elevated to moderate or extreme categories 
by use of advanced manipulation techniques. 
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• Such an arrangement:
– Would license individuals and research facilities. 
– Would subject individual projects to prior review.
– Would set conditions for the conduct of research and for the 
dissemination of results calibrated to the degree of danger 
involved.
– Would initiate procedures of harmonizing the review judgments 
made in separate jurisdictions  
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Determination of Danger
• Criteria for Oversight Jurisdiction:
– Activities of Extreme Concern (AEC):
• Any work on the variola virus (smallpox) or a comparably 
virulent agent that has been eradicated in nature,
• Any spontaneously infectious agent requiring BSL 4/ABSL 4 
level of containment,
• De novo synthesis of any agent matching the above 
characteristics,
• Expanding the host range of an agent or changing the tissue 
range of an agent that would otherwise be assigned to a 
lower tier category,
• Constructing vaccine resistant or antibiotic resistant strains of 
agents that would otherwise be assigned to lower tier 
categories. 
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– Activities of Moderate Concern (AMC):
• Increasing virulence of listed agent or related agent.
• Insertion of host genes into listed agent or related agent.
• Increasing transmissibility or environmental stability of listed
agent or related agent.
• Powder or aerosol production of listed agent or related agent.
• Powder or aerosol dispersal of listed agent or related agent.
• De novo synthesis of listed agent or related agent.
• Construction of antibiotic- or vaccine-resistant related agent.
• Genome transfer, genome replacement, or cellular 
reconstitution of listed agent or related agent. 
13
– Activities of Potential Concern (APC):
• Work with listed agent— or exempt avirulent, attenuated, or 
vaccine strain of select agent — not covered by AEC/AMC.
• Increasing virulence of non-listed agent.
• Increasing transmissibility or environmental stability of non-
listed agent.
• Powder or aerosol production of non-listed agent. 
• Powder or aerosol dispersal of non-listed agent. 
• De novo synthesis of non-listed agent.
• Genome transfer, genome replacement, or cellular 
reconstitution of non-listed agent
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– A survey of US grant applications and research 
publications 2000 – 2005 indicates that under these 
criteria of jurisdiction a total of 310 research facilities 
and 2,574 individuals would have been subjected to 
oversight, of which:
• 12 facilities and 185 individuals would have been assigned to 
international oversight;
• 14 facilities and 133 individuals would have been assigned to 
national oversight.
• 231 facilities and 2,119 individuals would have been 
assigned to local oversight.
• 53 facilities and 137 individuals would have encountered 
multiple jurisdictions. 
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• Criteria for project evaluation:
– Spontaneous transmissibility =
capacity to propagate between hosts under standard 
conditions.
– Infectivity =
capacity to penetrate a host and reproduce. 
– Pathogenicity =
capacity to generate a lethal of otherwise hostile effect within
an infected host.
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Conceptual Parameters of Danger
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Assessment of Operational Danger
• Immediate terrorist threat is comparable to or 
less than the natural incidence of infectious 
disease.
• Hostile competition among national threat 
assessment programs is a more serious 
immediate concern.  
• Exclusive subordination of national threat 
assessment activities to public health jurisdiction 
and transparency rules is an urgent priority. 
